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REMADE IN JAPANt 
Jennifer Friesen* 
JAPAN'S REsHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW. By William B. 
Gould. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 1984. Pp. xvii, 193. 
$19.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
Japan - in particular, Japan as a force in the international busi-
ness community - is probably in the news and on the minds of more 
Americans these days than at any time since World War II. Japan's 
fabled productivity and efficiency are viewed with admiration, with 
envy, and with hostility by the American business and labor communi-
ties. Japan's increasing share of the world market contributes to a 
perceived rise in tensions between our two nations. Into the melange 
of myth and mystery through which many ofus still view Japan's busi-
ness success drops a timely and enlightening volume, Stanford Law 
School Professor William Gould's Japan's Reshaping of American La-
bor Law. The first major contribution on comparative aspects of Japa-
nese and American labor practices outside of the legal and trade 
literature, the book goes a long way toward sorting out some of the 
answers to the question, "How do they do it?," as well as that ques-
tion's inevitable follow-up: "What can we (or should we) learn from 
them?" 
Japan's Reshaping of American Labor Law is accessible to both 
law-trained and lay readers with an interest in labor relations, 
although many of the references to labor statutes and rulings will be 
best understood by those with a grounding in labor law. Coverage of 
labor issues is selective, but broad. After a chapter devoted to an over-
view of Japan's legal and industrial relations system, Professor Gould 
undertakes a comparative study of American and Japanese labor law 
in six areas: history of the enactment of the labor laws, the adminis-
trative process, remedies for labor law violations, job security, unfair 
labor practices, and treatment of labor in the public sector. 
In many regards, the Japanese legal framework for labor relations 
closely resembles our own. Japan's Reshaping is about more than the 
law of labor relations, however; it introduces not only two statutes but 
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two cultures. It is the author's detailing of the two nations' pro-
foundly different historical experiences and cultural attitudes, with 
their effect on the real practice of labor relations, that makes his work 
so intelligible and so fascinating. 
True to their social patterns in general, Gould explains, the Japa-
nese are the prime exponents of the cooperation model of labor rela-
tions. Americans, on the other hand, expect labor relations to be 
adversarial, and are suspicious when they are not (p. 163).1 This fun-
damental difference in orientation between cooperation and confronta-
tion colors every chapter of the book. 
Thus, among the threads that run through Japanese industrial re-
lations are commitment of management and labor to moderation and 
group-oriented compromise, relative egalitarianism across worker-su-
pervisor lines, and mutual loyalty between the employee and the com-
pany.2 These are the values which often seem most to distinguish 
Japanese labor practices from our own - somewhat ironically, since 
at least egalitarianism and loyalty are also held to be highly prized 
American social ideals. 
The translation of the value of cooperation into the Japanese work-
place means, for example, that management has largely given up 
resistance to unions and in fact shares company information and deci-
sion making with workers to a degree unknown in this country (pp. 
12-13, 56, 95). Egalitarianism means that the gap between corporate 
executive salaries and workers' wages remains much smaller than it is 
here, and that Japanese corporate boards commonly include former 
union members (pp. 5, 166). Loyalty means low mobility of the work 
force, both labor and management, and employer avoidance of unem-
ployment; strikes, quits and layoffs are all much less common (pp. 9-
11, 13-14).3 In exchange for advancing these values, the Japanese sac-
rifice other values which are perhaps dearer to many Americans: the 
single-minded pursuit of individual and corporate economic self-inter-
est, the institutionalization of confrontation and adversarial tactics on 
both sides, the fierce independence of labor unions and workers from 
management influence, and the worker mobility and management flex-
ibility which characterize our "at-will" employment system. 
I can hear union sympathizers drumming their fingers at this 
point, as if to say, "Cooperation is all very fine for management, but 
what does it do for the workers? Aren't Japanese unions under this 
system little more than ineffectual company lackeys?" Unfortunately, 
1. See also p. 94 (citing the landmark opinion of Justice Brennan for the Court in NLRB v. 
Insurance Agents' Intl. Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960)). 
2. See, e.g., pp. 4-5, 9-16, 142-43. 
3. Loyalty does not necessarily mean worker docility. Bitter words and, by our standards, 
outrageous "acts of protest" against management are not uncommon in Japan. See, e.g., pp. 124-
26, 136-41. 
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the efficacy of the Japanese model of representation, from a worker's 
point of view, is a subject about which Professor Gould has compara-
tively little to say. He does note that the Japanese style oflocal enter-
prise unionism ( one plant, one union) lends itself both to the strengths 
of easy mobilization and plant solidarity and to the weaknesses of 
union dependence and susceptibility to company manipulation (p. 9). 
Japanese wages are often believed to be depressed, but some writers 
disagree,4 and, as Gould suggests, transportation and housing al-
lowances commonly contribute to the compensation package (p. 12). 
Interestingly, "concession bargaining," so much a part of the Ameri-
can bargaining picture in the 1980's, has long been built into Japanese 
bargaining; bonuses, varying according to a particular firm's financial 
well-being, constitute as much as thirty percent of a year's wages (p. 
7). Unions and workers, then, have a powerful incentive to ensure the 
employer's productivity and competitiveness. In good times, a fairly 
structured bonus system also prevents management from passing on 
record profits disproportionately to its executives and its shareholders, 
a practice which sometimes corrodes union-management relations 
here at home. Whether Japan's system represents a net gain to em-
ployees over the American system, however, is left to the reader's 
judgment. 
A predisposition toward cooperation rather than confrontation is, 
naturally enough, reflected in sometimes subtle but significant differ-
ences in legal doctrine and practice under Japan's labor law as well as 
in the cultural substratum of labor relations behavior. That point may 
be demonstrated by an overview of Japanese labor legislation. 
I. JAPANESE LABOR LAW: STATUTES AND OTHER SOURCES OF 
LAW 
The title of this book- Japan's Reshaping of American Labor Law 
- can be misleading. Actually, the title is a double entendre, but only 
one of the meanings is intended. The book is not about any changes 
the United States has made in its labor relations due to emulation of, 
or competition with, Japanese rivals. Rather, it is about the ways in 
which Japan has dramatically reworked her American-type labor laws 
- l~ws imposed upon Japan, it turns out, by Americans during the 
postwar occupation. Gould rightly claims that the pronounced simi-
larity in the two countries' labor legislation which came about because 
of this historical fortuity provides students of comparative law with an 
unusually fine opportunity to see how dissimilar cultures produce dif-
4. See, e.g., Ross, What is Japan, and What is Not Japan?, 37 Bus. & SocY. REV. 31, 34 
(1980). The same author, addressing the myth oflow cost Japanese labor, says: "The real reason 
for lower labor costs in Japan: Toyota estimates thirteen man-hours needed to build one of its 
cars; it estimates thirty man-hours for a comparable GM model." Id. at 34-35. 
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ferent answers to the same legal questions (pp. 16, 19). That, indeed, 
is the chief theme of Japan's Reshaping of American Labor Law. 
A. History of Japan's Modern Labor Legislation 
A fascinating history surrounds the enactment of Japan's Trade 
Union Law (TUL), first effective in 1946. In August of 1945, immedi-
ately after the Japanese surrender, the United States announced a 
post-surrender policy for Japan which would require the promotion of 
"social reforms" and "democratic forces," including the promotion of 
labor unions (pp. 17-18). The statutes which were eventually passed 
during the occupation under the careful supervision of the Allied 
forces bore a striking resemblance to American labor law of that era. 
Before 1946, Japanese labor law did not, apparently, exist in any 
meaningful form (p. 23). The United States, on the other hand, had 
had a long history of labor agitation and some ten years of experience 
with the New Deal era National Labor Relations Act.5 The imposi-
tion of the NLRA model upon Japan in the 1940's was historically 
odd, because in Japan the law would serve as the generator, rather 
than the consequence, of grass-roots organized labor activity (p. 23). 
Professor Gould, exhibiting an appreciation for historical irony, points 
out the further oddity that American policy thus placed General 
Douglas MacArthur - a right-wing Republican opposed to union in-
fluence in big business at home - in charge of promoting unions 
abroad. While the official stuff of MacArthur's Tokyo press releases 
consisted of lofty statements praising the "unionism of labor - that it 
may be clothed with such dignity as will permit it an influential voice 
in safeguarding the working man from exploitation and abuse and 
raising his living standard to a higher level," MacArthur was probably 
more in sympathy with the idea that labor unions would counterbal-
ance the power of the large industries which had supplied the Japanese 
war machine (pp. 17-18). 
The modem Trade Union Law, after major amendments in 1949 
appeased American critics who felt that it wasn't enough like our 
home product, borrows almost intact most of the key features of the 
American NLRA. Thus, the TUL's stated purposes are to promote 
equalization of employee bargaining power and to protect self-organi-
zation for collective action, including selection of representatives for 
negotiations (pp. 34-35). Both statutory schemes exclude "supervi-
sors" from the definition of protected "employees."6 For the Ameri-
can core concept of employee "concerted activities" protected by 
section 7 of the NLRA,7 Japanese drafters substituted immunity for 
5. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 
u.s.c. §§ 151-169 (1982)). 
6. See p. 4; 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982). 
7. 29 u.s.c. § 158 (1982). 
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"appropriate or proper acts" by trade unions or their members. 8 As in 
the NLRA, the "unfair labor practice," adjudicated before a govern-
ment agency, is the legal means of enforcing employer obligations and 
worker rights under the TUL (pp. 40-42). In both systems, such obli-
gations and rights include the employer's obligation to bargain collec-
tively with the workers' representative, a prohibition against employer 
retaliation or discrimination because of protected union activity, and a 
prohibition against financial assistance by employers to labor organi-
zations (though this prohibition is weakened in Japan by permitting 
employers to furnish office space to unions) (pp. 34-39). Unlike the 
amended NLRA,9 the TUL does not proscribe union unfair labor 
practices, although Gould explains that a similar effect is achieved by 
imposing criminal or civil penalties on "inappropriate" union behav-
ior, and by a kind of "clean hands" prerequisite to full relief for unions 
levying charges against employers (pp. 40, 89). 
Up to this point, the Japanese law seems familiar enough - but 
now comes a startling departure. The Japanese have never institution-
alized what is for Americans the centerpiece of modem union organi-
zational struggles: the union election. Under the NLRA, the process 
of selecting a union representative has been consciously modeled upon 
our democratic method for selecting our political representatives. 
That is, the American union's potential constituency (the bargaining 
unit) is ordinarily designated by government officials; thereafter an 
election is conducted by secret ballot among the eligible voters within 
the unit. 10 The ballot will list the union that has petitioned for an 
election as well as any other labor organization vying for the job of 
"exclusive representative."11 The union which receives more than fifty 
percent of the valid votes cast assumes, as in political races, both the 
right and the obligation to represent in good faith the employment 
interests of all members of the unit - including those who may op-
pose this union, or who may, indeed, oppose all unions. This poten-
tially substantial minority is not permitted to act through another 
representative nor to refrain from being represented. Further, unless 
prohibited by local "right to work" laws, the union in power is permit-
ted to negotiate with the employer for a contract requiring even non-
consenting unit members to pay union dues. 12 
As Gould points out, virtually none of these features exists in Japa-
nese labor law (pp. 37-38). The TUL contains no provision for selec-
8. The phrase seems peculiarly "appropriate" to a culture dominated by unspoken rules of 
propriety in its social conduct. Yet the phrase has been criticized, Gould notes, for its extreme 
vagueness, a serious defect when one considers that the practices of labor relations, and thus a 
conception of what was "proper," were so undeveloped in Japan at this early date. Pp. 23-24. 
9. 29 u.s.c. § 158(b} (1982). 
10. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c}(l} (1982). 
11. 29 U.S.C. § 159{a) (1982). 
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).(1982). 
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tion of a union or designation of an "appropriate unit," and no 
concepts of majority rule and exclusivity as we know them. Initially, 
the union has the right to represent, without election or further for-
malities, those workers who want to be represented by it. Union se-
curity agreements can be negotiated if the union already represents a 
majority in the plant, and its collective bargaining agreements with the 
employer will extend to all workers in the plant when three-fourths are 
already bound (p. 26). But apart from these two instances, majority 
rule and exclusivity have no place in Japanese labor relations. Gould 
explains that Japanese management opposed the American system as 
giving too much power and authority to a single union, while the di-
vided Japanese union movement opposed it as potentially decimating 
the power of those unions shut out of the process by the dictates of 
exclusivity (pp. 37-38). As a result, Japanese employers may find 
themselves obligated to bargain with two or more unions representing 
the same types of workers in the same plant. 13 
There are other differences in the Japanese statutory law. Among 
the most interesting are the subtle linguistic differences in those por-
tions of the TUL that adopt the form of the NLRA but with a twist 
that is peculiarly Japanese. One of them, highlighted by Professor 
Gould, is in the expression of the "unfair labor practice" concept. The 
Japanese statute uses the phrase futo rodo koi - "improper" labor 
practices - although a literal translation of the English words -
fukosei rodo koi - was possible (p. 39). It appears that the concept of 
"unfairness" is awkward or unnatural in Japan in describing personal 
relations; "unfairness" is a criticism more appropriately addressed to 
government action (p. 40). "Impropriety" is thus the TUL's standard 
both for employer treatment of employees, or for protected employee 
acts. This subtle distinction may reflect the Japanese bias toward reso-
lution of private societal problems by reference to group interests or 
culturally encouraged consensus, in contrast to the American insis-
tence on protection of rights-based, individual interests, whether as-
serted against the government or against a private party. Professor 
Gould seems to agree when he characterizes the Japanese focus in un-
fair labor practices as "not public rights or wrongs, but rather 
problems that need third-party assistance so that harmony and com-
patibility may be facilitated (p. 43)." 
B. Statutes in the Extralegal Context - Japanese Cultural 
Expectations and Industrial Relations in Practice 
Comparative scholars stress that true comparativism must tran-
13. Part of the explanation for the Jack of exclusive, majority rule lies in the modern Japanese 
constitution, which guarantees the righfof all workers to bargain. This provision is held by some 
to protect the right of Japanese workers to act individually or through a minority union, p. 38, 
although that interpretation is hardly compelling. 
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scend a merely descriptive approach to foreign labor institutions and 
concentrate instead on the functions those institutions perform within 
the foreign society. It is not enough to know how the text of legisla-
tion compares to ours without also knowing how (and whether) it 
works in practice.14 How it works, it seems, will depend on such 
things as whether the law is truly needed or is instead superfluous to 
social rules and agreements that do the real work of governing; 
whether the law gives power or rights to a segment of society with 
either incentive or power enough to make use of them; and whether 
the country itself has made compliance with the law such a public 
priority that its officials have devoted adequate resources and firmness 
to its adjudication and enforcement. 
By this measure, Professor Gould's functional approach to his sub-
ject shows him to be a good comparative scholar. His book, although 
short on explanations of comparative theory or methodology, gener-
ously documents instances in which Japan's different cultural attitudes 
and expectations, general legal system, and industrial relations norms 
- interacting with the statutes governing the trade unions - lead to 
results under those statutes that depart from our own. These illustra-
tions of Japan's system (for the author admits his treatment is only 
illustrative) make fascinating introductory reading for the reader with 
even a passing interest in Japanese society or business. Beyond that, 
the illustrations of comparative methodology in practice should cap-
ture the imagination of legal thinkers for whom comparativism, far 
from being merely a diverting excursion to foreign shores, is a tool for 
generalization, for theory, and even for reform at home. The reformer 
who likes what a foreign system has achieved will also be concerned 
with the foreign law's "transplantability" (as comparative scholars re-
fer to it), an issue discussed further below. 
A selected inventory of illustrations support Professor Gould's 
claim that different cultural contexts produce different results even 
under nearly identical statutory language. Thus, for example, because 
in Japan the supervisor-worker relationship is regarded as familial and 
fiduciary rather than adversarial and arms-length, and because the su-
pervisor-worker roles tend to blur more, Japanese law as actually 
practiced does not require unions rigidly to exclude supervisors from 
their ranks (pp. 4-5). Because of the custom of enterprise unionism, 
the words "company union" describe for the Japanese the normal 
close relationship between the plant and the union, while to American 
ears and courts they denote a union that is corrupt, ineffectual, or 
management-infiltrated (pp. 3, 83). Both countries formally condemn 
company domination or assistance to unions, but the United States 
practice is much more rigorous (pp. 35-36). 
14. Blanpain, Comparativism in Labour Law and Industrial Relations, in COMPARATIVE LA-
BOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 17, 22-24 (R. Blanpain ed. 1982). 
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Other examples fill the pages of Professor Gould's book, but per-
haps two more, relating to litigation practice, will especially surprise 
American readers familiar with labor practice here. In Japan, individ-
ual grievance arbitration, so much a part of American rights-based 
expectations, is almost unknown (pp. 11-12). Devotion of major polit-
ical and economic resources to pursuit of individual claims is inconsis-
tent with the Japanese penchant for group consensus and 
nonconfrontation. Moreover, in the unusual cases in which labor dis-
putes are litigated as unfair labor practices, Japanese law stipulates 
that neutral "public" labor commissioners, who do not come from the 
ranks of labor or management, have exclusive jurisdiction to decide 
such cases (pp. 40-42). American practice has no parallel. Our five-
member National Labor Relations Board has no places reserved by 
law for neutrals. 15 Indeed, it has come to be expected that its member-
ship will be dominated by persons who share the political biases of the 
appointing administration. The criticism of President Reagan's new 
managment-oriented Board, for its rapid reversal of comparatively 
pro-employee doctrines of long standing16 is only a more dramatic ex-
ample of the unsettling effects of building our deep-seated adversarial 
expectations into our policy-making and adjudicating bodies. 
C. Beyond Statutes: Problem-Solving Without Law 
These are some of the ways in which the Japanese have "reshaped" 
rather than rejected the American transplant. However, the Japanese, 
unlike Americans, prefer to solve major societal problems by private 
arrangements rather than by law. Indeed, it has been said that the 
Japanese hate law: 
With the exception of lawyers and persons with some knowledge of law, 
Japanese generally conceive of law as an instrument of constraint that 
the state uses when it wishes to impose its will. Law is thus synonomous 
with pain or penalty. To an honorable Japanese, the law is something 
that is undesirable, even detestable, something to keep as far away from 
as possible. To never use the law, or be involved with the law, is the 
normal hope of honorable people. To take someone to. court to guaran-
tee the protection of one's own interests, or to be mentioned in court is a 
shameful thing .... In a word, the Japanese do not like the law.17 
This attitude explains much about Japanese labor relations in gen-
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982) (creating National Labor Relations Board and providing 
for presidential appointment of members). 
16. See, e.g., Apcar, NLRB's New Majority Uproots Principles Set Under Carter, Angering 
Many Unions, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1984, at 35, col. 4; Greenhouse, The N.L.R.B. Has a New 
Lineup and Line, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1984, at ES, col. 1; Middleton, NLRB: An Agency in 
Turmoil, Natl. L.J., July 2, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (reporting perceived pro-management about-face in 
new Board's policies). 
17. Duff, Japanese and American Labor Law: Structural Similarities and Substantive Differ-
ences, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 629, 637 (1984) (quoting Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE 
LAW 159-60 (1976)). 
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eral. In particular, it would lead an observer to expect that solutions 
to major labor issues in Japan are not confined to litigation under the 
statutes just discussed, but should be sought in the extra-legal context 
of custom. And this is where a good comparative scholar finds them. 
Of the many customary labor practices touched upon in the book, 
perhaps two best illustrate the Japanese way. These are also two top-
ics which I think will most readily seize the attention of the American 
reader: job security and worker access to company financial informa-
tion. Both are topics much in the news in contemporary legal and 
business America.18 Both are areas in which Japan offers solutions 
which may be profoundly admired by Americans - or profoundly 
mistrusted. And in neither case is the Japanese solution reached as a 
result of any American collective bargaining law. 
l. Permanent Employment 
"Job security" in Japan means, in part, the institution of so-called 
permanent employment (shushin koyo)~ Most Americans' conceptions 
of this institution are more myth than reality. Professor Gould reports 
that only about twenty percent of Japanese wage earners - generally 
those in the larger industrial companies - have such guaranteed life-
time employment. This privileged sector is the beneficiary of ex-
traordinary corporate measures to avoid layoffs, even in times of 
economic stress.19 But there is a negative aspect to this picture. Wo-
men (about forty percent of the work force) are rarely afforded perma-
nent status.20 And, to a degree unknown to General Motors or United 
States Steel, Japanese companies rely heavily on subcontractors. In 
hard times, these generally unorganized, relatively underpaid workers 
are the first ones to be laid off, and they can even be "bumped," or 
displaced, by permanent employees (pp. 2-3, 10, 105). Finally, even 
the permanent worker, unlike his counterpart in the United States, 
becomes vulnerable when he is older. No Japanese legislation or cus-
tom prohibits age discrimination in employment; layoffs or manage-
ment pressure to retire21 may begin at age forty-five and retirement 
18. See, e.g., Gordon, To Get Workers Working, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1984, at A2S, col. 1 
(advocating increased job security and worker participation in management, rather than threats 
oflayoffs, to boost efficiency); Greenhouse, High Court Rules in Labor's Favor, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
3, 1981, at A24, col. 1 (Supreme Court holds employees do not lose protections ofNLRA simply 
because their jobs give them access to employer confidential information). 
19. Pp. 9-10. Gould states, without elaboration however, that shushin koyo "affects the 
thinking and the policies of most employers in Japan." P. 11. 
20. P. 11. Indeed, Japan lacks any legislative equivalent to our familiar Title VII, forbidding 
job discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2 (1982). Constitutional prohibitions against sex discrimination are routinely ignored by 
Japanese employers and the lack of any stare decisis doctrine in Japan's basically civil-law tradi-
tion makes constitutional litigation an ineffective means of achieving lasting justice for female 
workers. Pp. 10S, 108. 
21. Katatataki (tap on the shoulder) is the term for such pressure. P. 10. 
February 1985] Remade in Japan 991 
age is generally between fifty-five and sixty. 
According to Gould, permanent employment in Japan is not the 
product of law or collective bargaining (p. 11).22 It is a paternalistic, 
"unilateral" act of the employer, but one which has become so en-
grained in workers' expectations that it may be a kind of law-in-cus-
tom. No similar job protection from economically motivated 
dismissal exists in this country. On the contrary, the deeply engrained 
cultural expectations in the United States (at least those of manage-
ment) seem to be that a company should have absolute freedom to 
dismiss unwanted labor whenever it is profitable to do so. Absent 
management benevolence, American workers' interests in continued 
employment in layoff situations are left to whatever their union (if 
they have one) can squeeze out of management, and even the right to 
bargain about management decisions to close a business or relocate a 
plant is rapidly shrinking under recent court decisions and the rulings 
of the present appointees to the National Labor Relations Board.23 
Thus, in Japan, the preservation of large-industry jobs from the 
ravages of economic downturn has been accomplished largely without 
the aid of the collective bargaining law. In the United States the effort 
at preservation has generally failed in spite of the law. 
Where custom or collective bargaining fails to protect job security, 
workers may tum to courts. Interestingly, the much talked about re-
cent movement by some American courts- to protect workers from un-
just dismissal through modification of common law tort and contract 
doctrine24 does have a counterpart in Japan. Gould reports that Japa-
22. However, he later states that the courts in Japan have, despite the absence of statutory or 
constitutional authority, imposed strict ''just-cause" limitations on employers' ability to dismiss 
workers for economic reasons. The courts require proof that the economic crisis is real and that 
there is no reasonable alternative (including transfer or voluntary resignation) to dismissal of the 
particular employee. Pp. 106-09. 
23. See, e.g., First Natl. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Otis Elevator 
Co., 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1281 (1984). Nevertheless, recent collective 
bargaining agreements in the automobile industry may signal a significant movement toward 
institutionalizing some kinds of protection from job loss in economic downturns. See Approval of 
New Contract by UAW Local Leaders, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 103 (Oct. 8, 1984) (General 
Motors workers who lose their jobs due to new technology or transfer of work to receive full pay 
and retraining or reassignment). 
24. See Pp. 109-11. A thorough and helpful review of this development up to 1982 can be 
found in The Employment-At-Will Issue, Lab. Spec. Proj. Unit (BNA) (Dec. 2, 1982). See also 
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in 
Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980). There has been growing interest in the United 
States in institutionalizing this concept through comprehensive unfair-dismissal legislation. Such 
statutes have been put before legislatures in California, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, and 
Ohio. See Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. 
L. REv. 481, 495 (1976). Gould states that the American labor movement has been indifferent to 
such legislation essentially because unions would lose an effective inducement for unionization of 
those workers already protected by the law. P. 112. Since the book was published, however, the 
AFL-CIO has gone on record in support of pending unfair-dismissal legislation in California, a 
law which could be of great historical importance if enacted. Bernstein, AFL-CIO Supports Leg-
islation to Protect Non-Union Workers From Unjust Firing. L.A. Times, Sept. 13, 1984, § 1, at 22, 
col. 1. Professor Gould does not indicate whether Japanese unions experience difficulty in or-
992 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:982 
nese lower courts have imposed a stringent "just cause" limitation on 
all dismissals, whether for economic or disciplinary motives (pp. 106-
09). Apparently the judicially implied good-faith obligation in Japa-
nese employment relations has written into court-made law for all 
what is the customary "law" for the few (p. 109). 
2. Sharing of Company Financial Information 
Rational company decisions whether to close a business or insti-
tute massive layoffs are based on financial information concerning 
profitability and productivity. All over the world, unions and workers 
are vitally interested in having advance notice of major business dislo-
cations affecting job security and in knowing the financial information 
upon which these decisions are based. Access to financial and business 
planning information ordinarily permits unions to bargain more intel-
ligently and may lead to suggestions or concessions that would prevent 
job losses (p. 99). The responses of industrialized countries to work-
ers' demands for otherwise confidential company data are various. 
But no two countries are further apart in their responses than the 
United States and Japan. 
During the last decade or so, Japanese unions in the larger compa-
nies have routinely received company information about sales, profits, 
mergers, plant closures, automation and the like, through "joint con-
sultations" independent of, but preceding, collective bargaining (pp. 
99-100). Again, this practice is dictated by a Japanese knack for con-
sensus, not by law or union compulsion. Professor Solomon Levine, in 
a recent article which recounts the history of Japanese union-manage-
ment cooperation, describes the relation of joint consultation to collec-
tive bargaining as complementary rather than competitive. According 
to Levine, this intense communication does indeed produce rational 
and flexible wage bargaining, typically a lowered wage demand from 
the union in exchange for management's promise to refrain from 
layoffs. 25 
The Japanese consensus model does not exist in the European Eco-
nomic Community, but unions have access to confidential information 
as the result of recent law making (p. 99). It is the American practice 
which seems starkly out of step. Although Gould notes some excep-
tions, chiefly in the automobile industry, American industry leaders 
have failed to develop informal consensus mechanisms to assist intelli-
gent bargaining about wages and layoffs (p. 101). And again, when 
ganizing job-protected workers. In any event, it is at least plausible that unions could actually 
derive an organizing benefit from such a law, since employees will need advice and advocacy in 
pursuing their new rights, much as the United Mine Workers and other unions monitor safety 
rights guaranteed by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). 
25. Levine, Japanese Industrial Relations: What Can We Import?, in N.Y.U. THIRTY-SIXTH 
ANNUAL CoNFERENCE ON LABOR 2-1, 2-29, 2-34 (1983). 
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consensus has failed, the law has not filled the gap. The NLRA makes 
no express provision for information-sharing to assist bargaining; the 
sole exception in the case law is that the union may demand disclosure 
of management's books when management pleads "inability to pay" 
wage demands made at the bargaining table (pp. 101-02),26 a duty eas-
ily circumvented by rephrasing management's position as unwilling-
ness rather than inability. And, of course, there is no duty to supply 
information justifying a decision to close a factory (at least not if moti-
vated chiefly by entrepreneurial concerns other than labor costs) for 
the simple reason that such a decision itself falls outside the scope of 
the duty to bargain (p. 102). 27 
This issue forms the basis for one of Gould's strongest criticisms of 
American labor practice: 
Real problem solving is avoided by employers who view the firm simply 
as their own property and characterize its internal affairs as none of the 
concern of the union and the workers. Such antediluvian thinking 
hardly comports with what should constitute corporate responsibility to 
workers and the public [P. 102.] 
Professor Levine agrees that joint consultation is one of the most im-
portant lessons we can "import" from the Japanese.28 A mature ap-
proach to labor relations requires much more devotion than we 
presently show to problem-solving and mutual trust. The hide-the-
ball psychology of American companies instead displays a regrettable 
attitude that employees are uncooperative and irresponsible adver-
saries in a company's struggle to remain profitable. Unions that are 
kept in the dark and then criticized by press and public for not being 
loyal to employers or reasonable in their bargaining demands surely 
cannot be blamed for a certain amount of bitterness and mistrust in 
return. 
II. TRANSPLANTABILITY OF JAPANESE LABOR LAW 
Both management and labor in the United States have reason to 
look around, perhaps even to look abroad, for solutions to the declin-
ing fortunes of some sectors of American big business and the escalat-
ing divisiveness, and even hostility, which mars our labor relations. 
Comparative scholars, however, caution us against assuming that any 
pattern of law can be transplanted outside the environment of its ori-
gin. Labor law is obviously part of a system, and the consequences of 
changing even one element of the system depend on the relationships 
among all elements of the system. Some aspects of labor relations laws 
relate to the distribution of power in the society: these are laws which 
allocate to the collective the power to organize, to strike, to participate 
26. The leading case is still NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
27. See Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1281 (1984). 
28. Levine, supra note 25, at 2-34. 
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in management decision making, and to obtain binding third-party in-
tervention (arbitration) in disputes over what portion of the profits and 
other privileges should belong to labor. Decisions about allocations of 
power are likely to involve entrenched political and economic struc-
tures and values. A leading scholar thus has concluded that such col-
lective labor law is resistant to transplantation, while individual labor-
related laws - protection from discrimination, wage and hour laws, 
provisions for job security - are much more easily transferred outside 
the country of origin.29 
Professor Gould is cautious about transplantability, whether of 
collective or individual rights. He concludes his book with some brief 
suggestions about how the United States might emulate Japanese labor 
practice, although he does not use or formulate any particular theoret-
ical model to explain his choices. Most of Japan's system, he says, is 
simply too far outside of the American cultural tradition to survive 
here (p. 162). He points in particular to the importance of the Japa-
nese concept of worker. dependency ( amae) in building attitudes of 
group cooperation and employer responsibility. American workers, he 
states, could not tolerate such formal subordination (p. 162). I agree, 
but I would perhaps emphasize more the profound difference between 
American and Japanese attitudes toward subordinating individual to 
group interests. 
We are a nation steeped in the primacy of individual "rights." We 
assert these rights in court at an astonishing rate, not just against gov-
ernment, but against whoever limits our liberty to pursue our sense of 
individual justice. In the employment arena, tensions between collec-
tive and individual interests surface in so-called "Right to Work" 
movements, in reverse discrimination complaints, in fair representa-
tion suits, and in Landrum-Griffin suits against unions. Japanese cul-
ture, for whatever reasons - Japan's long history as a nation, its 
relative isolation, its racial homogeneity - prizes group solidarity and 
the transcendence of cooperation over the advancement of individual 
self-interest, an attitude that must contribute much to a sense of com-
munity within the union. As one scholar of Japan has written: 
Children are taught the virtue of cooperation for everyone's benefit, and, 
however annoying they may find group pressures, adults remain respon-
sive to group attitudes for they are convinced that everyone gains from 
restraining egoism. 30 
Confrontation is to be avoided; the pursuit of abstract justice through 
litigation is the behavior of millionaires or psychopathic personalities 
(p. 58). 
Such restraint of ego, except ego in its most antisocial manifesta-
tions, is hardly a dominant American ethic. It would be surprising if 
29. Blanpain, supra note 14, at 29-30. 
30. P. 1 (quoting E. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA 98 (1979)), 
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our strong sense of individualism did not surface in a group-oriented 
experience like unionism. American workers who are represented by a 
union might choose to view the union experience as an opportunity for 
self-government, for involvement in a group process with solidarity as 
its major premise, or merely as a means to buy greater levels of com-
fort and security for themselves. Some say the latter has become the 
dominant ethic of the American union worker. In this view, union 
representation is a service one pays for, much as one would pay an 
agent to protect one's financial interests in a business deal.31 
If this is the view of most American workers, then American dem-
ocratic unionism is as threatened by the attitudes of the workers it 
wants to represent as by those employers who s_eem bent on digging 
for the union movement an early grave. Professor Gould does not 
comment at any length on the role of group consciousness in Ameri-
can unionism, although he suggests in his conclusion that "American 
society and American workers need to develop a greater sense of the 
group and a consequent sense of solidarity." (p. 164). 
Despite his conclusion that comparatively little of the Japanese 
system can be transplanted because most of it is culturally, rather than 
legally, dictated, Professor Gould does make positive suggestions for 
reform in this country based on his comparative study (p. 162). He 
advocates relatively modest legal changes to permit American compa-
nies to cooperate more with unions and nonunion employee groups by 
allowing them greater use of company facilities and by fostering 
worker participation programs (p. 164). He also urges amendment of 
the NLRA to protect all workers from unfair dismissal, which would 
bring the United States in line with other industrialized countries in 
legislating job security (p. 165). 
I believe there may be more that we can learn from the Japanese 
experience, short of "transplanting" any of her particular practices. 
We will perhaps never become "Japanese" in our attitudes toward, 
say, union-management cooperation or paternalistic protections 
granted by employers. But that does not mean that Japanese behavior 
is unaffected by the law, or that we might not find such a behavioral 
link that would enlighten our own efforts at law reform. At least one 
area of labor practice in which Japan's system is so different from our 
own - our election-based method for choice of a union representative 
- is ripe for such reform. The Japanese experience in this area, while 
probably not "transplantable," can provide empirical evidence about 
the extent to which different legal rules might help produce, in Japan, 
results or behavior that we want to produce at home. The particular 
results desired here are the protection of the worker's legal right to 
31. See, e.g., Kuttner, Can Labor Lead?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 12, 1984, at 19, 25 
(quoting an American union organizer critical of this attitude). 
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organize and the fostering of employer behavior which respects that 
legal right, results we are presently far from achieving. 
Even where deep-seated cultural biases are involved, laws can 
change behavior either by levying sanctions on specific undesirable 
acts or by removing existing incentives to the pursuit of antisocial con-
duct. In either case, the law changes the legal environment, which 
causes a reassessment in the rational actor's self-interest. Indeed, in 
imposing sanctions on undesirable conduct, idealists hope for more: 
they hope that at a subtler level legal condemnation of certain prac-
tices will perform an educative function that will inspire a morally 
based change of behavior. Our laws prohibiting sex and race discrimi-
nation in employment, for example, have without doubt done much to 
raise the national consciousness about egalitarian justice. Many hope 
that there is now at least some greater notion among the citizenry of 
the legitimacy of these claims than there was in 1964, and that at least 
some persons have concluded, as a result of the laws, that discrimina-
tion is wrong and unacceptable as well as simply illegal. 
Apparently this educative aspect of law, if it works at all in civil 
rights, has been a miserable failure for labor rights. The NLRA, like 
the Japanese TUL, prohibits employers from discharging workers for 
engaging in union activity. Nevertheless, nearly fifty years after the 
passage of the Act, employer violations of this law are at an all-time 
high.32 Since the late 1950's, the number of wrongfully fired workers 
ordered reinstated by the NLRB has increased tenfold, to over 10,000 
per year.33 Professor Weiler of Harvard Law School has surmised 
from figures provided by the NLRB that a majority of these workers 
were fired during union election campaigns, and that "the current 
odds are about one in twenty that a union supporter will be fired for 
exercising rights supposedly guaranteed by federal law a half-century 
ago."34 Nor does the NLRA seem to have served an educative func-
tion with the American public, which has hardly exhibited a height-
ened respect for workers' exercise of their legal rights to organize. By 
contrast, one would surely expect to witness serious public outrage if 
even one woman or one black worker out of twenty were fired for 
protesting on-the-job discrimination. 
Since the rights guaranteed by the NLRA evidently carry little 
moral weight with violating employers, something obviously must be 
done to alter the violators' assessment of their self-interests. Here the 
evidence from Japan may be enlightening. What are the comparable 
statistics for illegal discharges in Japan? Professor Gould reports, gen-
erally, a dramatically lower incidence of all employer unfair labor 
32. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the 
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. RE.v. 1769, 1778-81 (1983). 
33. Id. at 1780. 
34. Id. at 1781. 
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practices in Japan. Though Japan has one-half the population of the 
United States (p. xv), the number of unfair labor practices filed with 
the various labor commissions against Japanese employers in 198035 
amounted to fewer than three percent of those filed with the NLRB 
against employers. 36 Even allowing that the Japanese figures are in 
some part underreported because Japanese courts, unlike ours, may 
also entertain unfair labor practice complaints (p. 45), this disparity is 
astonishing. 37 
Such a startling difference deserves explanation. The figures seem 
to point inescapably to the conclusion that Japanese employers are 
more law-abiding than American ones. Is it that they are inherently 
disposed to "propriety," or could it relate in part to the fact that Japa-
nese law gives employers less to gain by breaking the law? I want to 
speculate that, even allowing for a cultural dislike of confrontation, 
part of the explanation for the low incidence of anti-union dismissals 
must lie in the absence from the Japanese system of both the union 
election and the accompanying principles of exclusivity and majority 
rule. These differences mean that an employer has less reason and less 
opportunity to suppress unionization by firing the organizers. As Pro-
fessor Gould states: 
Straightforward union organizational struggles, so prominent on the 
American litigation landscape, simply do not occur with frequency in 
Japan. As in Europe, employer resistance to unions is less severe, for 
without the doctrines of exclusivity and majority rule it becomes virtu-
ally impossible to avoid unions altogether. 38 
Gould's figures do not show how many of the 862 Japanese com-
plaints lodged in 1980 were for discriminatory (anti-union) discharges 
nor how many were adjudged meritorious. Figures from the NLRB 
indicate that two-thirds of its 1980 charges alleged discrimination 
against union activity, of which forty percent were found to be merito-
rious, resulting in the 10,000 reinstatements mentioned earlier. Recall 
that most of these 10,000 were workers fired during representation 
campaigns. Since there is no union election in Japan, where workers 
choose their union by private agreement, the employer is afforded no 
opportunity to "test" worker preferences by employing coercive tac-
tics during a representation campaign. Of course, Japanese union or-
ganizers can still be fired, but such firings will more likely come after a 
35. See p. 48 (Table 3.1). 
36. Weiler, supra note 32, at 1780 (Table II) (citing 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 243 (1980)). 
Gould's comparative figures for United States unfair labor practices, p. 48, are not helpful for 
this particular comparison because they include charges filed against unions. Japan has no provi-
sion for union unfair labor practices. 
37. The extent to which discriminatory discharges in Japan are litigated in court rather than 
before the labor commission is unclear, but it appears to be relatively small. See pp. 45-48. 
38. P. 56. On the other hand, Gould reports, instances of illegal employer discrimination 
favoring one union over another are on the rise in Japan. Id. 
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selection has been made and cannot have the effect, as in the United 
States, of inducing a no-union election vote which will bar another 
union election for at least a year. 39 
The evidence from Japan lends additional plausibility to the major 
thesis of Professor Weller's definitive article: the elimination of the 
election and the representation campaign as we know them is essential 
to any serious reform program for stemming the skyrocketing rate of 
employer intimidation of employees seeking to organize unions.40 
Professor Weiler reaches this conclusion only after reviewing in 
great depth the ineffectiveness of the current American system of rem-
edies for employer coercion, particularly campaign-related discharges. 
Remedies for discriminatory discharge - normally reinstatement and 
back pay - involve extreme delay and almost trivial financial liability 
for the employer, since the wronged worker has any interim wages 
actually earned (or unreasonably foregone) deducted from the back 
pay award.41 Yet by firing union organizers, the employer stands to 
break the back of a movement which could end in a costly labor con-
tract. From the employer's point of view, Weiler concludes, the finan-
cial incentives for employers to break the law "are too great to be 
blunted by the prospect of monetary sanctions at any feasible level, 
and . . . unfair labor practices have now reached proportions that no 
procedure for immediate injunctive relief could possibly handle."42 
Elimination of the representation campaign, he suggests, eliminates 
the employer's most potent opportunity for illegitimate interference 
with employees' choice, an opportunity which arises when the union 
movement at the workplace has begun, but is still comparatively small 
and weak. 
Professor Weiler does not suggest complete deregulation akin to 
the Japanese model. Rather, his proposal would allow rapid certifica-
tion of a majority union by the appropriate labor agency, based either 
on the union's presentation of signed authorization cards from a ma-
jority of the unit, or on the results of an "instant election" held imme-
diately upon presentation of such cards.43 Weiler explains that this is 
precisely the approach of the Canadian labor law, which otherwise 
emulates the American law by making the union, once selected by the 
majority, the exclusive bargaining agent of the unit.44 
Professor Weller's suggested reform is well taken and should be 
adopted. Instant elections or certifications apparently work in Can-
ada, a society so like our own that cultural considerations should pose 
39. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1982). 
40. Weiler, supra note 32, at 1770. 
41. Id. at 1787-93, 1795-97. 
42. Id. at 1804 (footnote omitted). 
43. Id. at 1805. 
44. Id. 
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no serious barrier to transplantability. And Professor Gould's work 
uncovers no serious problem in Japan with eliminating the union elec-
tion or accompanying campaign. The point of the suggested reform is 
simply to maximize employees' uncoerced opportunities to choose 
their representative, which is, after all, their business, not the em-
ployer's. Reforming the election process to better effectuate the em-
ployees' choice implies nothing about an employer's legitimate right to 
resist collective bargains that it finds unacceptable. The choice of a 
bargaining representative - on either side - is but the barest begin-
ning of the collective bargaining process. 
CONCLUSION 
Japan's Reshaping of American Labor Law collects such a wealth 
of research that I cannot claim to have touched upon all of its ( or even 
all of its major) themes in this review. Any reader who is the least bit 
thoughtful about the state of labor relations in this country ought to 
accept Professor Gould's invitation to pursue her questions beyond the 
shores of California and Hawaii. His book is not without its frustra-
tions - in any introductory book, some questions go unanswered -
but the reward is well worth the reading. Certainly the book delivers 
one of the chief benefits of comparative study, which is to place the 
reader's own national experience into a healthy perspective. 
Americans, who have so frequently been guilty of displaying arro-
gance and ethnocentricity toward the global community, have as 
much to learn about themselves as about their neighbors by engaging 
in comparativism. At the very least, it is impossible to walk away 
from reading a book like Japan's Reshaping of American Labor Law 
with the feeling that the American way is cast in stone, or even in 
steel. 
